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This paper extends the seminal creative destruction growth model of Aghion/Howitt
(1992) to investigate the relationship between unemployment and growth. We distinguish
low-skilled and high-skilled labour and assume that a union bargains over the low-skilled
labour wage. This causes unemployment, but the growth eect is ambiguous. On the one
hand the higher wage will squeeze expected prots of innovators, which is bad for growth.
On the other hand the union aects the marginal product of high-skilled labour and hence
the high-skilled wage in the manufacturing sector declines. This causes a "migration" of
high-skilled labour from the manufacturing into the research sector. This eect is growth
enhancing. We show that the overall eect depends crucially on the elasticity of substitution
between high-skilled and low-skilled labour. With an elasticity less than one the "good"
growth eect dominates the bad, and vice versa. In the Cobb Douglas case the two eects
cancel out.
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Traditionally, growth and unemployment have been analysed rather separately. This dichotomy is
justied on the grounds that unemployment is caused by business cycles, so it occurred only in the
short run, whereas growth is a long run phenomenon. With the emergence of the unemployment
problem in continental europe, the view was challenged by the notion of equilibrium (i.e. long
run) unemployment. Hence the time dimension of unemployment changed, and a large part of it
was seen as structural. By and large, this structural unemployment has been put down to labour
market institutions. This begs the question of whether unemployment causing institutions aect
the growth path of an economy.
From an empirical point of view the relationship between growth and labour market insti-
tutions is unclear (see Nickell and Layard (1999) and Daveri and Tabellini (2000)). While the
relationship between unemployment causing variables and TFP growth is weak or non-existent,
Daveri and Tabellini report a signicant negative relationship between growth and unemploy-
ment.
The usual theoretical framework of jointly analysing growth and unemployment have been
models, where unemployment is generated by costly search (see e.g. Bean and Pissarides (1993),
Pissarides (2000) or Aghion and Howitt (1998)).1 Usually these models explain mainly the
impact of growth on unemployment. In this paper, however, the reversed causality is analysed,
where we model the equilibrium unemployment as caused by union wage bargaining and show
the eect of unionisation on growth.
An early paper analysing the impact of a unionised labour market on growth is Kemp and
van Long (1987), which incorporates a union into a neoclassical growth model. They show that
the union will have either no impact on the economy in the long run or that the capital stock
will approach zero (depending on the rate of time preference of the union). In a comment to
this paper, Palokangas (1989) showed that there might also be an intermediate case with both
growth and unemployment. Palokangas (1996) incorporates union wage bargain into a Romer
(1990)-type model and analyses a union bargaining over the wage of low-skilled and high-skilled
labour in the intermediate sector. He is able to show that the existence of the union might foster
growth. In a recent paper, Boone (2000) demonstrates that the existence of a union dampens
the growth rate of the economy because rms will invest too many resources in the reduction
of overhead costs so that the growth rate of the quality of a product is too low. Other recent
papers analysing potential eects of unions on economic growth are Quang/Vousden (1999),
Irmen/Wigger (2000), Faini (1999), De Groot (2001) and Br auninger (2000).
This paper shows that a unionised labour market aects the growth rate of the economy,
1In a recent paper S ener (2000) presents a schumpeterian growth model with search unemployment.
1but that the eect is ambiguous. The impact of the union depends crucially on the elasticity
of substitution between high-skilled and low-skilled labour in the intermediate sector. To make
this point, the model of Aghion/Howitt (1992 and 1998 resp.) is extended to include high-skilled
and low-skilled labour. It is assumed that a union bargains the low-skilled wage. With this
setting we generate two dierent union eects. Firstly a "good" growth eect by indirectly
shifting high-skilled labour into the research sector and a "bad" eect by reducing prots in
the intermediate sector, which discourages innovators. It will be shown that the elasticity of
substitution is an important parameter in determining the dominant eect, because the wage
bargain has an asymmetric eect on the labour demand and the labour supply of high-skilled
labour in the research sector and the elasticity of substitution determines this asymmetry.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section briey presents the standard growth
model with high-skilled and low-skilled labour. In the third section we will allow for a union
which bargains the low-skilled wage with the employer. We will analyse the consequences for un-
employment and the growth rate of the economy. The fourth section considers the consequences
of ecient bargaining and the last section concludes.
2 The Basic Model
2.1 The Economy
The economy consists of three sectors. A competitive R&D sector where new ideas are produced,
a monopolistic intermediate good sector, where the incumbent monopolist supplies the latest
generation of the intermediate good to the nal goods sector and nally the nal goods sector,
in which the consumption goods are produced using the "state-of-the-art" intermediate good.
The basic inputs of production in the economy are low-skilled labour, high-skilled labour and
the intermediate good. Utility is derived from consuming nal goods. The production function
of the nal goods sector takes the following form:
Yt = At  X

t : (1)
Yt is the amount of nal goods produced with the intermediate good of generation t, Xt. At is the
eciency parameter of generation t. The parameter  is restricted to be between 0 and 1. The
dynamics of the nal goods sector arises from the evolution of the eciency parameter At. Every
new generation of the intermediate good causes A to grow by a factor : At+1 =   At. This
growth factor  is xed and exogenous to the model.2 In the intermediate sector the leading edge
2An important point to notice is that certainly only the growth rate of A between two generations of interme-
diate goods is constant. Whereas the time between the innovations is random. That is the growth rate per unit
2intermediate good generation is produced using low-skilled labour, L, and high-skilled labour,
N. The production function is assumed to be CES. So the production function takes the form:
Xt = [  L
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where Xt is the amount of the intermediate good, Lt and Nt is the amount of low-skilled labour
and high-skilled labour, respectively. The parameter  is usually referred to as the distributional
parameter of the production function and  is a measure of the substitutability between the two
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for high-skilled labour. Equilibrium in both labour markets can be determined employing some
additional assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that low-skilled labour, L, is supplied totally
inelastically and that the stock of L is exogenously given and time invariant; hence in the basic
model there is no unemployment. Denoting the low-skilled stock by  L, the equilibrium in the
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Allocation of the exogenously given and inelastically supplied high-skilled labour  N is tied down
by the assumption of perfect mobility between the intermediate and the R&D sector. This
assumption allows to determine the equilibrium by a no-arbitrage condition, which ensures that
the high-skilled wage cannot dier between sectors.
Researchers use high-skilled labour to develop new generations of the intermediate good. If
a researcher is successful in inventing a new product generation, he will be the new intermediate
monopolist and replaces the incumbent one. Innovations are governed by a Poisson process and
arrive randomly at the rate NR&D
t  , where NR&D
t is the proportion of the high-skilled labour
force employed in the research sector and  is a xed parameter of the Poisson process. The value
of being the new monopolist (at some point in time , when the generation t is state-of-the-art)
of time of A is not constant.
3Note that  = 1 
 , where  is the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs.
4Note that we normalized the price of the consumption good PYt to one and that we used the intermediate good
demand of the consumption good sector, which can be derived from prot maximization as PXt =   X
 1
t  At.
3is Vt+1. This value is given by the asset equation:
Vt+1  r = t+1     N
R&D
t+1  Vt+1; (6)
where t+1 is the ow prot of the monopolist and with probability   NR&D
t+1 , he is replaced by
a new innovator. In this case the incumbent monopolist gets nothing. Using the intermediate
good demand of the nal product sector and the labour demand functions, we can derive the
monopoly prot as:
t+1 = (1   )    X

t+1  At+1: (7)
Using (7), we can derive the demand for high-skilled labour in the R&D sector:
W
R&D
t =  
1
r +   NR&D
t+1
 (1   )    At+1  X

t+1 (8)
Equations (4) and (8) determine the allocation of high-skilled labour between the intermediate
and the research sector. By using the full employment condition  N = N+NR&D and At+1 = At,
we get a forward looking dierence equation in NR&D:
 
1
r +   NR&D
t+1
 (1   )      At  X

t+1 = 
2  At  X
+




Equation (9) determines a steady state equilibrium if we impose NR&D
t = NR&D
t+1 = NR&D. We
get a steady state level of high-skilled labour working in the research sector N
R&D and this level
determines the growth rate of the economy. From Equation (1), and using At+1 =   At the
growth rate of the economy is:
gY = ln()    N

R&D (10)
Equation (9) cannot be solved explicitly for steady state values, but it can be shown that an
equilibrium exists.5
5These results are available from the author upon request.
42.2 The Properties of the Steady State
We now impose steady state conditions on equation (9) and log-linearise. The linearised equation
(9) reads (a '' denotes the relative change of a variable, hence dX
X  ~ X):
~ N

R&D =   

(1   b)  ~  + ~      s
L  ~  L +
(1 +   sL)
a
 ~  N + ( 
1
1   
)  ~ 

; (11)
with sL and sN denoting respectively the steady state production elasticity of low-skilled and








(1   a) is the part of the high-skilled labour force employed in the research sector) and   
(b + [  sL + 1] 
(1 a)
a ) 1  0.6
A rise in the parameter of the Poisson distribution, , causes the steady state level of high-
skilled labour, employed in the research sector to rise, since (1 b)  0. The economic intuition is
the following: on the one hand a higher  raises the rate of creative destruction, which discourages
potential inventors to hire high-skilled labour, but on the other hand the research success will
turn up faster; this encourages researchers. The latter eect dominates because of the positive
time preference of the agents, they care more about getting the prots today than loosing them
tomorrow. The higher the growth rate of the eciency parameter, , the higher is the level of
high-skilled labour employed in the research sector, because a higher  results in higher prot
opportunities when becoming a monopolist. The impact of low-skilled labour is ambiguous and
depends on . If  is greater (smaller) than one, the impact is positive (negative). Because the
economic intuition is also crucial to understand the union eect, we defer the discussion to the
next section. A rise in the stock of high-skilled labour causes the steady state level of high-skilled
labour in the research sector to rise, because more high-skilled labour is allocated uniformly to
the intermediate and the research sector. A rise in  results in a higher price elasticity of the
demand for the intermediate good and this causes monopoly prots to decline. This lowers the
marginal productivity of high-skilled labour in the research sector and therefore the amount of
high-skilled labour employed in the research sector.
3 The Impact of a Labour Union
3.1 Union Wage Bargaining
We assume that the union and the new monopolist bargain over wages and after the wage
agreement the intermediate good monopolist will choose the amount of labour he wants to hire,
6Note that we assume the production function as being constant (~  = ~  = 0).
5given the bargained wage. The sequence of events in the model is the following: after an innovator
has been successful and before starting production of the new generation of the intermediate
good, he has to bargain with the labour union over the wage for low-skilled labour. After a wage
agreement he hires low-skilled and high-skilled labour according to the factor demand curves and
starts producing. When the incumbent monopolist is driven out of the market, the process starts
anew and the new monopolist has to bargain again with the union. Note that we assume away
insider power, which means that after a wage agreement ends (so after the monopolist is driven
out of the market) every union member has again the same probability of becoming employed
(which would be the same as to assume that after the wage agreement, the new monopolist
chooses randomly (e.g. history independent) from the low-skilled labour force).
After these more general assumptions and institutional settings we have to take a closer look
at the utility function the union wants to maximise.7 To keep the model as simple as possible, we
decide to apply the so called "rent maximisation" utility function (this function can be derived
from the expected utility function if we assume some sort of income transfer within the union,
see Pencavel (1994) ch.3). Hence the utility function of the union takes the explicit form:
U = L  (W
L    W L): (12)
The union seeks to maximise the dierence between the bargained wage W L and the competitive
wage  W L times the number of employed. The competitive wage is a reference scenario for a union
member and this reference scenario is exogenous to the union. Following the standard approach
in the literature on wage bargaining, we assume the Nash bargaining solution to determine the
wage for low-skilled labour. The solution to the wage bargain will maximize the following Nash
product:

 = (U    U)
  (    ); (13)
where  is the (relative) bargaining power of the union, U is union utility after an agreement is
reached,  U is the disagreement point of the union,  are the prots of the monopolist after an
agreement and   is the monopolist's disagreement point.
When applying the Nash solution to a bargaining problem much respect has to be payed how
to model the disagreement points (see Binmore, Shaked, Sutton (1989) and Binmore, Rubinstein,
Wolinsky (1986)). The disagreement points reect the impasse utilities, which is the utility ow
during the bargain. We assume that there is no employment of low-skilled labour during the
bargain. Furthermore high-skilled and low-skilled labour are imperfect substitutes, i.e.  is
7An overview over potential specications of union utility functions, see e.g. the surveys of Oswald (1985),
Booth (1995) or Pencavel (1994).
6nite. With these assumptions the impasse utility of both parties is zero, hence  U =   = 0. The
outside option for the union when the bargain is quit unilaterally is the competitive outcome.
For the monopolist the outside option is zero, because in the case he quits the bargain he is not
able to produce anything. As shown in Binmore, Shaked, Sutton (1989) these outside options
serve as constrains in the determination of the Nash solution.
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By the envelope theorem, @
@WL =  L. Moreover,  WL
L  @L
@WL denotes the wage elasticity of
low-skilled labour demand. Due to the assumed bargaining structure the union has to bear in
mind that a wage hike has two consequences for low-skilled employment. Firstly, there is a static
eect that the higher the wage the less low-skilled labour will be hired (this is a movement along
the low-skilled labour demand curve) and secondly less low-skilled labour results in a change
in the amount of high-skilled employed in the intermediate sector in the steady state. This
has repercussions on the demand for low-skilled labour, since high-skilled labour employed in the
intermediate sector is a shift parameter of the low-skilled labour demand curve. So the constraint
the union faces in the bargaining process is the "total labour demand curve". Letting " denote
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which is a markup on the wage in the competitive case  W L. This markup depends on the union
power , on the total labour demand elasticity ", and the relation of low-skilled labour income
to prots. From equations (3) and (7) this relation is:







Equation (3) also yields an expression for the wage elasticity of low-skilled labour demand:
" =  
1






N can be derived using equation (11). From this equation we know that:
dNR&D
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Hence we obtain the wage elasticity of total labour demand as:
" =
1
(1 + )   ( + )  sL   ( + )  1 a
a       sL: (20)
" reects the two above mentioned eects. On the one hand a wage hike will result in lower
labour demand. On the other hand there will be a reallocation eect of high-skilled labour due
to the change in employment of low-skilled labour. If the elasticity of substitution is less than
one (implying that lower low-skilled employment results in a decline of high-skilled employment
in the intermediate sector), the reallocation eect lowers the marginal productivity of low-skilled
labour. Thus the low-skilled employment loss due to a wage hike is rather hight (the (absolute)
value of the elasticity of total labour demand will be high). The opposite is true if  is greater











Log-linearising the markup in ,  and sL yields 8 we get:



































The coecient of a change in union power ~ , 1, is clearly positive. Hence a rise in union power
will raise the markup. 2 is unambiguously positive, since one can show that @"
@ is positive, i.e., a
higher  lowers the markup, since a higher price elasticity of demand for the intermediate good
8Throughout the paper we treat sL and sN as exogenous variables (although this is only true for the Cobb
Douglas case). We justify this simplifying assumption on the basis that rstly we only analyse small changes
around some steady state and that secondly these second round eects are rather small in size. So the underlying
error of "quantitative nature" and very small.
8implies lower monopoly prots, which the union is able to capture. Thus the markup is lower. 3
is unambiguously negative, because it can be shown that @"
@sL is positive for all ( +) 6= 0. The
economic intuition is, that due to the assumption of a CRS production function, sN falls when
sL rises. But a decline in sN lowers the quasi rents generated by high-skilled labour which lowers
the bargained wage. Furthermore the demand curve for low-skilled labour becomes atter with
a higher sL, so that the bargained wage falls.
3.2 The Employment Eects of the Labour Union
This subsection examines how parameter changes inuence the steady state (un)employment of
low-skilled labour. The preceding analysis of union behaviour established that the wage in the
low-skilled labour market is a markup on the competitive wage:
W
L =    W L: (23)
Because of the "right-to-manage" assumption, both wages are given by the labour demand equa-
tion (3). We restrict our analysis to steady states and assume that steady state employment
of high-skilled labour in the intermediate sector is N( L) in the competitive case and N(LU)
in the presence of union wage bargaining. Hence employment in the unionised economy will be
time invariant and so will be the unemployment rate.9 By substituting the wages in equation
(23) by the labour demand equations, we get:
At  [  (L
U
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  1:
(24)
Log linearisation of equation (24) around a steady state (which determines steady state unem-
ployment) yields:
~ L
U =  "  ~  + ~  L: (25)
The change in steady state employment of low-skilled labour depends only on the markup and on
the amount of low-skilled labour in the economy. More low-skilled labour will raise employment
in the unionised economy, but the rate of unemployment will remain constant.10 A rise in the
9Note that steady state unemployment will only occur if the reference wage (which is in our case  WL) grows
at the same rate as the increased technology shifts out the low-skilled labour demand (see equation (3)). If this
is not the case the unionised economy will converge to the competitive economy.
10The change of the unemployment rate is by denition ~ U = L
 L L(~  L   ~ LU). If the change in the low-skilled
labour pool causes union employment to change proportionally, i.e. ~  L = ~ LU, the unemployment rate will not
9stock of low-skilled labour lowers the reference wage  W L and hence, with a constant markup,
lowers the union wage and raises employment. The change in employment will be equal to the
change in the stock of low-skilled since the wage elasticity of labour demand is assumed constant.
In the more general case the wage elasticity determines whether the unemployment rate will rise,
remain constant or decline. However the qualitative result, that an increase in the low-skilled
labour pool raises low-skilled employment remains unaected. Finally a higher markup (e.g. due
to higher union power ) raises the bargained wage and lowers employment of low-skilled labour.
3.3 The Growth Eects of the Labour Union
It has been shown that the growth rate of the economy depends positively on R&D sector
employment (and hence on the allocation of high-skilled labour). The equilibrium allocation in
the case of a unionised low-skilled labour market is given basically by equation (11), with the only
dierence that in the unionised case employment of low-skilled labour is LU. So using equation
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(1   b)  ~  + ~  +   s
L  "  ~      s
L  ~  L + (  s
L + 1)  ~  N + ( 
1
1   
)  ~ 

; (26)
With this equation at hands the growth eects of union wage bargaining can be analysed. Con-
sider rst an economy which consists of competitive labour markets for high-skilled, as well as for
low-skilled labour. This case of the competitive labour market is nested in the unionised model,
when  equals one. So we can analyse the impact of the union as a change in the markup  (the
markup is obviously an endogenous variable, but let us for the moment assume that we concen-
trate on a steady state, where we take the markup determining parameters as given. Later we
will also analyse the eect of changes in these parameters). Equation (26) reveals that changes
of the markup change ~ N
R&D and that the eect depends on . We can distinguish three cases.
In the Cobb Douglas case, where the elasticity of substitution is one and  is zero a change of the
markup has no eect on the amount of high-skilled labour employed in the research sector, i.e.
a union does not aect steady state growth. When low-skilled and high-skilled labour are very
good substitutes ( exceeds unity and  is negative) unionisation of low-skilled labour will lead to
a lower steady state high-skilled employment in the research sector and therefore lower growth.
The opposite is the case when substitutability between low-skilled and high-skilled labour is
low, i.e.  smaller than one and  exceeding zero. Then, steady state growth is faster and the
existence of the union may actually foster growth compared to a situation where the low-skilled
change. (See (35))
10labour market is competitive. In this case the economy faces a trade o between growth and
employment. Unemployment will lower the amount of consumable goods but on the other hand
it will raise the rate of growth.
What is the economic intuition behind these results? The union rations low-skilled labour,
which aects the marginal productivity of high-skilled labour in both the R&D and the interme-
diate good sector. If the impact of a change in L aects the marginal productivity of high-skilled
labour in both sectors asymmetrically this will cause migration of high-skilled labour and the
direction of this migration will determine the growth eect of the union. Marginal productivity
is given by:
~ W N = ~ At + (    1)  ~ N + ( + )  ~ X + (2  
  ln(X )

)  ~  (27)
~ W
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Using these equations we can see that the change in low-skilled labour employed has an asym-
metric eect on the productivity of high-skilled labour in the two sectors if and only if  6= 0.
If  is negative ( > 1), a decline in L lowers the wage in the intermediate sector by a smaller
amount than in the research sector. So we have a wage dierential favouring the intermediate
sector causing high-skilled labour to move into the intermediate good sector and thereby lowering
growth. The opposite is true when  is positive ( < 1). In this case the decline of the wage in
the intermediate sector will be bigger than the decline in the research sector causing a growth
enhancing migration of high-skilled labour into the research sector.
The economic intuition is straightforward. The eect of less low-skilled employment is more
severe, when  is smaller than one, because a factor substitution which could dampen the neg-
ative eect of lower low-skilled employment is hardly possible. So the decline of high-skilled
productivity in the intermediate sector is rather high. The opposite is true when both factors
are substitutes.
Since the markup is an endogenous variable we can, using equation (22) and (26), analyse
the impact of various parameters that determine the markup. Increased union power, , results
in a higher markup and hence we can apply the previous arguments. The eect of a change in
, the price elasticity of the intermediate good market, is ambiguous. On the one hand, a higher
 is bad for growth, because more competition in the intermediate good market implies lower
monopoly prots. This discourages researchers and the growth rate will decline. On the other
hand a rise in  will lower the markup. If  is less than one, a smaller markup will lower the
growth rate of the economy. Hence the direct eect is amplied by the existence of a union.
However, if  exceeds unity, a smaller markup will raise the growth rate. That is, there are two
11opposite eects on the growth rate and it is ambiguous which eect dominates. The coecient



































Equation (29) demonstrates the aforementioned eects. If  is less than one the coecient of
the impact of a change of  on N
R&D is negative. In the case of  exceeding unity the impact is
ambiguous, although simulation results suggest that the coecient is negative for a wide range
of parameter constellations, that is the direct eect of a change in  is likely to dominate the
indirect one. Finally a rise in  always lowers unemployment.
4 Ecient Bargaining
In the preceding analysis we restricted attention to points on the labour demand curve. What
happens when the bargaining between the union and the monopolist is ecient, that is, they
bargain over wages and employment?11 Since we assumed risk neutral union members, the
contract curve will be a vertical line over  L in wage employment space. Hence there will be
no unemployment of low-skilled labour. Nevertheless the bargained wage will be higher than
in the competitive case. The growth eect is straightforward. Since the wage will be higher
than in the competitive case, monopoly prots will be lower, which discourages innovators. On
the other hand, since low-skilled labour employed is  L, there is no "migration" of high-skilled
labour between the intermediate and the research sector. Hence the union eect unambiguously
lowers high-skilled labour employment in the research sector and thereby the growth rate of the
economy.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown the potential impact of a union on the growth rate of an economy
using a simple schumpeterian growth model based on Aghion/Howitt (1992 and 1998 resp.).
We extend the model to allow for high-skilled and low-skilled-labour as input factors in the
research and intermediate good sector and we allow for a labour union which covers low-skilled
labour. Union wage bargaining causes steady state unemployment in the economy where the
level of unemployment depends on the stock of low-skilled labour and on parameters inuencing
11The details of the ecient bargaining case can be found in the appendix.
12the union markup. Moreover the union changes the allocation of high-skilled labour between the
research and the intermediate goods sector. Hence the union aects growth. Two opposite eects
can be observed. Firstly there is a negative eect, because the union lowers the prots which can
be earned in the intermediate sector. Therefore the incentive to perform R&D declines, which is
bad for growth. Secondly the wage of the high-skilled declines in the intermediate sector because
low-skilled labour employment in the intermediate sector is smaller than in the competitive case.
This triggers a migration of former intermediate high-skilled worker into the research sector
thereby increasing the growth rate of the economy. Which one of these two eects dominates
depends on the elasticity of substitution in the intermediate good production function. If the
elasticity of substitution is less (greater) than one the latter (former) eect will dominate and the
union has a positive (negative) growth eect. In the Cobb Douglas case with  = 1 unionisation
of the labour market has no growth eect. Besides these growth eects, the union wage bargain
will cause low-skilled unemployment and a smaller wage dierential. If we allow for ecient
bargaining, the unionisation of the labour market is unambiguously bad for growth, because the
only union eect is the lowering of monopoly prots which discourages innovators.
13A Appendix
In this Appendix we derive the results of the ecient bargaining case in more detail. In this case
the union and the monopolist bargain over wages and employment. By maximising the Nash
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where R0(L) is the marginal revenue of low-skilled labour. Employment in the ecient bargaining
case will be on the contract curve implying that low-skilled employment will be  L. The wage
will be given by (A1) noting that L =  L. Some manipulations yield:
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Using this, equation (26) modies to:
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(A6)
So a movement from a competitive labour market situation to a unionised one with ecient
bargaining (which can be interpreted as a change of ) is unambiguously bad for growth.
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